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A B S T R A C T   
The examination of political risk, political uncertainty, and political institutions in the international business 
literature has, not unexpectedly, been shaped by the prevailing issues faced by firms at their time of writing. 
While these three separate angles together have provided an iteratively more comprehensive view of the politics 
and business nexus, they are still missing an important component, namely the ability of specific actors to utilize 
political uncertainty and generate institutional volatility. This paper examines the rise of two specific phenomena 
that challenge prevailing theoretical frameworks, and potentially have the ability to render our previous insights 
less relevant: first, the rise of populism as a persistent political force in developed economies, and second, the 
rapid spread and disparate political response to COVID-19. We argue that exclusively institutional-based 
frameworks are inadequate to cope with the political realities of the 21st century, as institutions themselves 
are being subverted or utilized for actions far beyond their original conception in practice and their oper-
ationalization in the IB literature (something that COVID-19 has exacerbated). Although extant IB work has 
much to recommend itself in helping to understand risk and uncertainty in the political sphere, these new 
challenges for business reveal that we need to incorporate political personalities, actors, and leaders(hip) into our 
research. Only then can we have a more complete picture of how politics can influence business.   
1. Introduction and contribution 
One who knows and knows that he knows… 
His horse of wisdom will reach the skies. 
One who knows, but doesn’t know that he knows… 
He is fast asleep, so you should wake him up! 
One who doesn’t know, but knows that he doesn’t know… 
His limping mule will eventually get him home. 
One who doesn’t know and doesn’t know that he doesn’t know… 
He will be eternally lost in his hopeless oblivion! 
Ibn Yamin (1286–1367) (Translated by Niayesh Afshordi) 
The future ain’t what it used to be. 
Yogi Berra (1925–2015) 
In 2016, the election of Donald J. Trump to the Presidency of the 
United States of America represented a remarkable success for a growing 
global movement built upon anti-globalization and anti-immigration 
rhetoric. Coupled with the referendum in the United Kingdom earlier 
that year to exit the European Union (EU) and the entrenchment of 
“illiberal democracy” within the EU itself (typified in Poland and 
Hungary), it appeared that the malaise of “populism” (defined in the 
majority of the literature as “an anti-establishment orientation, a claim 
to speak for the people against the elites,” see Rodrik, 2018), so common 
in the developing world, had come to the shores of the advanced de-
mocracies. By 2018, the populist wave appeared to be gaining mo-
mentum, with an average share of votes for populist and extremist 
parties across 33 European countries totaling 22.3 % (Timbro, 2019), 
and countries such as Belgium and Spain seeing up to a quarter of their 
parliaments comprised of populists (with an even higher share in 
Switzerland and Poland). The continuing anti-liberal stance of populist 
governments, and even the influence of populists not formally in power, 
have radically increased political and economic policy uncertainty 
globally and have the ability to influence the global environment for 
decades (Devinney & Hartwell, 2020). 
If we fast forward to 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic represented, if 
not a “black swan” (Taleb, 2007) event, certainly one that has further 
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complicated the economic, social and political environment roiled by 
the rise of populism in leading nations. Originating in Wuhan, China in 
late 2019 and spreading rapidly across the globe, the pandemic caught 
the world unaware, leading, at the time of this writing, to over 1.5 
million deaths worldwide.1 Indeed, the only thing that COVID appeared 
to leave untouched in its wake was the appeal of populism (with the 
exception of Donald Trump, who was dislodged from his perch in the 
White House in November 2020, likely as a result of his handling of the 
pandemic), as anger at the inability of elites across the political spectrum 
to combat the pandemic, and the apparent limits of existing institutions 
to deal with the threat, offered an additional avenue for 
anti-establishment leaders to thrive. For firms, the pandemic has 
impacted “normal” economic policy and created an uncertain world of 
lockdowns, prohibitions on social and economic activity, and severe 
disruptions in supply chains likely to last long past the formally ending 
of the pandemic itself (see, e.g., McLain, Matthews & Paris, 2021). 
Despite progress with respect to a vaccine, extreme uncertainty about 
the future persists, both with respect to the future of the pandemic and 
the second-order effects caused by government responses, making 
long-term planning for firms extremely difficult. 
These phenomena are the latest manifestations of a reality that the 
international business (IB) literature has grappled with for five decades, 
namely that the political-business nexus is fraught with danger for firms. 
Fowler (1965:3), in a missive that would not be out of place today, 
warned that “rising tides of nationalism are threatening the growth of 
multinational businesses – and of the free world economy.” In fact, the 
concept of political risk – and, by extension, the threat of political un-
certainty and the efficacy of political institutions – has waxed and waned 
as a topic of research interest, evolving in a reactive manner and driven 
by the actual conditions in emerging markets that multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) faced and the dominant threats of the day. In particular, 
political risk, defined most broadly as “factors such as instability and 
direct violence or constraints on operations such as expropriation, 
discriminatory taxation, public sector competition and the like” (Kobrin, 
1979:67), has been a staple of internationalization and MNE literature 
since the 1960s. At the same time, the concept of political uncertainty, 
widening the view of political influence beyond discrete policies as 
noted by Kobrin (1979) and encompassing ongoing instability (Ricks & 
Czinkota, 1979) and use of probabilistic modelling (Shubik, 1986), put 
the spotlight on managers as crucial for forecasting political events that 
might be deleterious for the firm (Sniazhko, 2019). The difficulties faced 
by multinationals working in different environments motivated subse-
quent work to concentrate on the role of institutions in mediating in-
centives (Peng, 2002) and generating political risk in a systematic, yet 
bounded, way (Mudambi & Navarra, 2002). At the same time, research 
in these areas became more sophisticated and shifted from a qualitative 
case-based approach on the influence of politics on business to a more 
nuanced and quantitative approach, relying on large-scale empirical 
studies across countries. 
However, the phenomenon of populism and the threat of the 
pandemic present a direct challenge to existing theoretical frameworks, 
as both phenomena are not only accelerating existing institutional 
change but potentially serving as originators of new institutional 
structures and creating institutional volatility (Hartwell, 2018). In 
particular, the breadth and depth of the success of populist political 
parties and leaders in winning power and their persistent success over 
time (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2020) is partly attributable to their 
ability to subsume existing institutional levers to their own ends, 
generating uncertainty rather than dampening it. Similarly, the uncer-
tainty surrounding COVID-19 has resulted in institutions being utilized 
for goals directly counter to those for which they are theoretically 
designed (and, in many instances, a removal of the checks and balance 
meant to keep these institutions more narrowly focused). For example, 
political institutions in liberal democracies are meant to facilitate free 
speech, the freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, and freedom to 
engage in commerce, rights which are all enshrined in founding docu-
ments and constitutions. Yet, faced with COVID-19, politicians have 
been utilizing these same existing institutions to force businesses to close 
(lockdowns), to break up gatherings of more than a certain number of 
people, and to restrict internal travel. On an international dimension, it 
has been argued that countries such as China and Russia have used the 
pandemic to take advantage of the distraction it is causing to adversaries 
to expand and consolidate regional and global power (see, e.g., Roth, 
2020 and Economist, 2020). 
In both of these situations, many aspects of the “rules of the game” 
are viewed as changing (Duclos, 2020; EU Parliament, 2020) and, while 
much of our present conception of institutions is that they set the 
boundaries of risk and uncertainty, what we have seen through popu-
lism and the pandemic is that they are actually pushing these boundaries 
outwards. We assert here that the key driver of the institutional changes 
created by populism and the pandemic is not coming from within these 
institutions (at least not initially), but is an exogenous shock created by 
the emergence of specific political leaders at a propitious point in time. 
Populism may be a popular idea, but without a vehicle – such as a 
charismatic leader – to give it a vector to power (Devinney & Hartwell, 
2020), populism cannot create substantive institutional change. Simi-
larly, the use of existing political institutions in ways antithetical to their 
design has occurred nearly everywhere across the globe during the 
pandemic (Sharma, Leung, Kingshott, Davcik, & Cardinali, 2020). While 
some of the variation in the extent to which institutions have been 
re-oriented can be explained by social norms, existing checks and bal-
ance, or even the severity of incidence of the disease, most of the specific 
policies implemented cannot be explained without recourse to the spe-
cific leaders involved (Hartwell, 2020). 
This reality has created the necessity for IB scholars to expand their 
vision, exploring the role of leaders and personalities as the drivers, 
facilitators, and utilizers of the political and social institutions which 
surround, animate, and constrain business. Although recent work on 
political risk has homed in on the issues of country context (Darendeli & 
Hill, 2016; Oh & Oetzel, 2017), IB has not expanded to a point where it 
can meaningfully and operationally encompass the importance of po-
litical leaders, relegating such insights to political science and viewing 
institutions as either black boxes or driverless vehicles. This state of play 
means that there is a vast opportunity for IB scholarship on under-
standing how populism (and in particular the populism of the 
post-global financial crisis world) or the specific breed of pandemic 
politics may influence and impact firm behavior in the future. In doing 
so, we may also understand how firms deal with the exigencies of their 
surroundings and, in turn, how firms can influence these surroundings. 
The purpose of this perspective article is to survey the past (both 
distant and much more recent) in order to understand the new chal-
lenges facing international business in the near future. In particular, the 
early and seminal works on political risk (Dichter, 1962; Kobrin, 1979; 
Kolde & Hill, 1967; Usher, 1965) and uncertainty (Jauch & Kraft, 1986; 
Ricks & Czinkota, 1979; Shubik, 1986), coupled with the institutional 
literature of the 1990s and 2000s (Mudambi & Navarra, 2002; Peng, 
2002), offer many insights for understanding firm behavior in both 
developed and emerging markets today. However, the current business 
climate has been shaped by a new type of risk, one driven by political 
leaders and the phenomenon of institutional volatility, creating un-
certainties that go beyond the realm of quantifiable unknowns and 
which are more accurately characterized by the VUCA (volatility, un-
certainty, complexity, and ambiguity) framework of Buckley (2020). 
Our contribution is to highlight these new challenges and their source, 
as political leaders push the boundaries of existing institutions, creating 
or exacerbating institutional weakness and shifting the rules of the 
1 Interesting, the black swan nature of the Covid pandemic is seen in Pekar 
et al.’s (Pekar, Worobey, Moshiri, Scheffler, & Wertheim, 2021) analysis that 
shows that the pandemic may not have occurred except for a small set of 
specific circumstances that stopped it from dying out quickly. 
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game. This form of institutional volatility has come about because of the 
ascendance of populism and the aggrandizement of power from the 
market to the state that has been seen during the COVID pandemic, 
creating a fundamental shift in business operating environments and 
threats of permanent changes to the business landscape. 
As we will show in this paper, the overall business climate has moved 
from one dominated by stationary and quantifiable political risk and 
institutional structures to one affected more directly by the non- 
stationary political uncertainty generated by leaders and political 
parties. Our assertion is that the IB literature needs to be updated to give 
consideration to these new forms of political influence and uncertainty, 
focusing on “unknown unknowns” and their effect on firms. We believe 
that the new political environment globally will require additional 
theoretical and empirical work to understand how firms can survive and 
thrive, building on the insights of the past four decades, with particular 
emphasis on the role that actor-generated uncertainty plays in the geo- 
political landscape. This may not lead to the elusive all-encompassing 
view of the political-business nexus, but it will be iteratively more 
nuanced than prevailing frameworks and, importantly, be crucial for 
better explaining what firms face in the world of today. 
2. From political risk to political institutions: a brief review 
The international business literature is no stranger to examining the 
political-business nexus, as extant research over the past five decades 
has incorporated political factors as an influence on firm decision- 
making. As this Section will show, there have been three separate 
waves of research over this time (summarized and defined in Table 1), 
distinct but not mutually exclusive and often with substantial overlap. 
However, the animating force behind each of these phases have been the 
problems which MNEs faced at the time, with the literature coalescing 
around the dominant issues of the time and seeking to explain the 
drivers and solutions to the problems of the day. 
2.1. Political risk and international business 
Spurred on by de-colonization and the explosion of opportunities in 
international commerce in the 1960s, IB quite rationally emphasized the 
importance of understanding the operational and strategic challenges of 
sometimes-trying foreign environments (Mascarenhas, 1982). MNEs 
often found themselves operating outside of their comfort zones, 
entering countries characterized by weak legal systems and erratic 
policies. It was in this context that the “political risk” literature emerged 
(Usher, 1965) – an entire research stream on the various risks and op-
portunities which MNEs faced outside of their home country (Zenoff, 
1967). Much of this work was primarily “inside-out,” discussing how 
environmental (Kolde, 1966; Lilienthal, 1960) and cultural contin-
gencies (Dichter, 1962) would impact models of multinational enter-
prise strategy, structure, investment and location choice and operational 
activities (Kolde & Hill, 1967). 
While much of the literature viewed culture was effectively static 
with the timeframe of business decisions, there was a distinctly dynamic 
aspect to political risk, as reflected by Lloyd (1974:25): “the nature of 
political change itself is frequently difficult to anticipate. This is further 
complicated by the fact that what is a political risk for one firm is not 
necessarily of any relevance to another.” The burgeoning political risk 
literature focused predominantly on the macro-political threats inherent 
in doing business in emerging markets, with the most important political 
risk faced by MNEs in the 1960s and 1970s as the risk of expro-
priation/nationalization. Indeed, “political risk” was seen as synony-
mous with expropriation in the IB literature: according to Fitzpatrick 
(1983:249, referring to International Bank for Reconstruction & Devel-
opment & International Chamber of Commerce: Commission of Foreign 
Investments, 1962), political risk was “loss of control over ownership or 
loss of benefits of enterprise by government actions.” High-profile 
nationalization and expropriation occurred throughout developing 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s (Burton & Inoue, 1984), chiefly con-
nected with natural resource industries (see Fig. 1) – as in Iran and Egypt 
(Guriev, Kolotilin, & Sonin, 2011) – or industries perceived as “critical” 
(Kobrin, 1984), as governments tried to “localize” production and keep 
local subsidiaries supporting national policies (Kobrin, 1980). 
This state of affairs subsequently became a fertile area of IB research 
Table 1 
The Evolution of Political Phenomena in the International Business Literature.  
Type of 
Disturbance 
Characteristics Examples Representative 
Papers 
Political Risk Quantifiable threats 
based on previous 
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Rice and 
Mahmoud (1986); 
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et al. (2015); Chao 
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(2010); Gaur, 
Kumar, and Singh 
(2014); Gaur and 
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Nieto (2015);  
Kostova (1999);  
Xu and Shenkar 
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Doh et al. (2017);  




(2002); Roth and 
Kostova (2003);  
Slangen and Van 
Tulder (2009);  










(2005); Flores and 
Höllerer (2019);  
Hartwell (2018)  
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(Hajzler, 2012), with papers focusing on mitigation strategies (espe-
cially Litvak & Maule, 1975, who posited a proto-corporate social re-
sponsibility could possibly deter expropriation), how MNEs were altered 
by risk (Bradley, 1977; Green & Smith, 1972), or even how managers 
ignored risk for expediency (Green & Korth, 1974). While sociology and 
political science focused on the strength and power of MNEs rather than 
their vulnerability (Aronson, 1974; Kimmel, 1975), papers such as 
Kapoor (1970), writing in the very first issue of the Journal of Interna-
tional Business Studies (and drawing on Bechtel’s experience in India), 
also showed how MNEs were constrained in their negotiations with 
host-country governments. 
While expropriation was the most prominent issue covered in the 
literature, additional threats to business were also examined as they 
became more salient, including the effects of political violence and 
terrorism on firm entry or operations (Bass, McGregor, & Walters, 1977; 
Robock, 1971), the challenges of de-colonialization (Kahler, 1981), and 
broad-based political change which could lead to discontinuities in 
business environment (Zink, 1973). These issues expanded in later 
waves of political risk research to encompass conflicts and instability (e. 
g., Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, Steen, 2010), perceptions (Giambona, 
Graham, & Harvey, 2017), political connections (Fernández-Méndez, 
García-Canal, & Guillén, 2018), and the location-specific risk mitigation 
strategies of MNEs (Darendeli & Hill, 2016; Oh & Oetzel, 2017). On a 
less sanguine note, Oetzel (2005) suggested that, even after decades of 
understanding political risk, management still refused to update their 
risk assumptions on an ongoing basis, despite the benefits of doing so. 
2.2. From risk to uncertainty 
Up to this point, the political risk literature lacked a unifying 
framework (Kobrin, 1979), relying on a mostly a collection of case 
studies (Fitzpatrick, 1983) and intuition (a point made by Gimabona 
et al. [2017] on risk perception) rather than a consistent analytic 
methodology. Although the methodological issues were addressed via a 
more quantitative approach in later waves of research (Boddewyn, 
2016; Simon, 1984), there still remained the need for a new theoretical 
innovation to place these discrete risks into a broader framework usable 
for business. Making use of qualitative and quantitative measures to 
understand risk from the perspective of the firm and how it could be 
dealt with organizationally, the literature of the 1980s separated the 
dangers of the politics-business nexus into two ideas: political risk – an 
issue of direct relevance for the firm (Fitzpatrick, 1983) – and uncer-
tainty – a broader environmental trait that could encompass regime 
shifts. As Root (1968:69) noted, “when the international manager makes 
a probability judgement of an uncertain political event in a host country, 
he thereby converts a political uncertainty into a political risk.” Thus, 
while risk might imply a discrete issue that firms could overcome with 
savvy management or financing decisions, “uncertainty” placed the 
emphasis on ongoing and pervasive environmental factors which were 
crucial for managers to face daily (Ascher, 1982; Howell & Chaddick, 
1994; Kobrin, Basek, Blank, & La Palombara, 1980; Mascarenhas, 1982; 
O’Connell & Zimmerman, 1979; Rayfield, 1986; Shubik, 1986). 
Bayesian at heart (i.e., modeling parameters as exogenously random 
but with underlying risk probabilities that can be calculated and upda-
ted), the driver of this move towards quantifiable unknowns and away 
from specific categorical risks was the changing international business 
climate of the 1980s, as the established problems of the 1960s and 1970s 
mutated and became more numerous. Emerging market crises, driven by 
the debt crisis in Latin America in the middle of the decade, combined 
with increasing terrorism and conflict in Africa and Latin America and 
Fig. 1. Expropriations in the Oil Sector, 1905–2005. 
Source: Mahdavi (2014). The figures use a sample of 61 countries to show the founding of a “state oil company” created via nationalization of existing private 
companies in that year. Used by permission. 
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macroeconomic instability, meant that business faced a broader panoply 
of issues. At the same time, expropriation remained a threat, but 
decreased as a major concern for MNEs and was utilized less as a tool of 
policy (Minor, 1994), becoming just another in a series of risks which 
could be priced into managerial strategies (Mahajan, 1990). This pro-
liferation of risks, including normal business risks unrelated to politics 
but to industry, market, or firm-specific variables, led directly to re-
searchers pushing for a more holistic approach to risk in general, 
incorporating political uncertainty as one of many unknowns (Miller, 
1992).2 As with the political risk literature, there was also a push to 
recognize firms as actors in the political sphere as well (Hutt, Mokwa, & 
Shapiro, 1986), identifying ways in which businesses could be proactive 
against political uncertainty (Jacobson, Lenway, & Ring, 1993) and 
perhaps mitigate preemptively (Taylor & Ferro, 1983).3 The specter of 
endogeneity also reared its head, as some scholarship posited that that 
firms could also create political uncertainty by their presence (Geller, 
1982);, their operations (Howell, 1992), or even their contribution to 
economic development (as growth creates new actors on the political 
stage, threatening overall stability even if the overall effect is salutary, 
see Donaldson, 1989). 
2.3. Politics as institutions 
While political risk and uncertainty stemming from specific policies 
(i.e., expropriation) was still of key concern for managers (Busse & 
Hefeker, 2007), the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the (soon-to-be) former Soviet Union, coupled with the rise of China 
and its own rapid institutional changes, unleashed waves of globaliza-
tion and liberalization in the 1990s and was directly responsible for the 
third phase of IB scholarship on the political-business nexus. The new 
business challenges accompanying globalization meant that the “new 
institutional economics” (NIE) revolution, predating the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and led by such authors as North (1986) and Williamson 
(2000), and its associated streams in sociology (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991; Streeck & Thelen, 2005) and organizational studies (Hirsch & 
Lounsbury, 1997; Selznick, 1996), was quick to filter through to IB. As 
Mudambi and Navarra (2002):636) noted, “institutions represent the 
major immobile factors in a globalized market,” and the shift towards 
institutionalism meant grasping the different types of institutions (Peng, 
2002), how they drove business environments (Murtha & Lenway, 
1994), and what challenges and opportunities they offered for business 
(Peng & Khoury, 2009) and their operations (Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar, 
2013). 
Explicit in this shift toward institutionalist thinking was attempts to 
get a deeper understanding of the role of political institutions in setting 
the rules of the game for businesses operating within their spheres of 
influence. A significant and logical start is seen Jensen (2008) and Li 
(2009), who focused on democratic regimes and their beneficial effects 
on the business environment, and Slangen and Van Tulder (2009), who 
asserted the overall quality of governance was a factor in reducing 
uncertainty for MNEs. Khanna and Palepu (1997) and Roth and Kostova 
(2003), brought together the worries of political uncertainty and polit-
ical risk from earlier IB work to address the intriguing situation of the 
impact of the absence of the rules of the game – i.e., “institutional voids” 
– and how this evolved to effect economic institutional development 
(Mickiewicz, 2009). Prominent amongst this literature was the threat of 
corruption, a consequence of weak institutions (Doh & Guay, 2004; Li & 
Ferreira, 2011), and thus voids spawned business environments that 
were death by a thousand bribes rather than being expropriated 
wholesale (Dela Rama, 2012). 
Work in institutional voids continues to result in a catalogue of 
specific political risks, as in Doh, Rodrigues, Saka-Helmhout, and 
Makhija, 2017:294), who noted that institutional voids could encourage 
“excessive rents to a few actors (reducing entrepreneurship) and market 
power (discouraging competition).” Empirical exercises by inter alia 
Demirbag, Glaister, and Tatoglu (2007)) and Li, Poppo, and Zhou (2008) 
confirmed these theories, showing how institutional voids and their 
consequences were a motivating factor in firm strategy. At the same 
time, institutional transition, creating a temporary void, could also 
generate political risk for firms associated with the “old guard” (Sun, 
Mellahi, & Liu, 2011), while deteriorating political conditions could 
force MNEs to uproot and move their headquarters (Valentino, Schmitt, 
Koch, & Nell, 2019). Institutional volatility, dancing around the void, 
need not even be the driver of deleterious consequences for business, as 
political stability in a void could have an impact on firm management if 
this stability occurred in a broader environment of change (Buck, Fila-
totchev, Nolan, & Wright, 2000). 
Perhaps more problematic for business was not the often-obvious 
situation where institutions were absent but the much subtler situa-
tion where there was institutional distance (Kostova, 1999; Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002) between home and host country institutions. Several 
papers in this vein (see Table 1) explored the effects of differences in 
institutional make-up and/or culture on various firm strategies, entry 
modes, and decisions, highlighting in depth how the distance from one’s 
own institutional milieu constituted a background political risk (others, 
such as López-Duarte & Vidal-Suárez, 2010 attempted to fuse institu-
tional distance and political risk into separate-yet-related phenomena). 
Buckley, Clegg, and Cross (2015) noted that institutional differences 
could even affect where firms chose to invest outside of their own 
countries, especially if desire to please the political elite by conforming 
to their preferences for certain allies was a key motivating factor. 
As in both the political risk and political uncertainty literature, there 
continues to be an emphasis on remedies for business in dealing with the 
exigencies of institutions. Research showed that firms which had inter-
national capabilities were more agile in general and could adapt to 
uncertainty at home (Beaulieu, Cosset, & Essaddam, 2006; Delios & 
Henisz, 2003), while emerging market MNEs, by dint of exposure to 
institutional risk on a regular basis, developed their own strategic agility 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, Ciravegna, Melgarejo, & Lopez, 2018; Grosse & Mes-
quita, 2007).4 Mair and Marti (2009:420) also turned the institutional 
weakness of a host country into more than just an obstacle to be sur-
mounted; using the case of Bangladesh and its weak formal institutional 
environment, they noted that “[institutional] voids [can be] opportunity 
spaces for institutional entrepreneurs.” And Hilmersson, Sandberg, and 
Pourmand Hilmersson (2015) emphasized that knowledge was indeed 
power, and some aspects of institutional uncertainty at least could be 
mitigated through repeated interactions within a country (although 
Bhaumik, Owolabi, & Pal, 2018] show that too much information could 
make a firm difficult to absorb for an internationally oriented suitor). 
2 An astute reviewer noted that volatility is encapsulated in both political risk 
and political uncertainty, a point we certainly agree with. While we return to a 
specific form of volatility below, namely institutional volatility, it is important 
to also address political volatility within the risk/uncertainty formulation of IB 
literature. Political volatility is both a specific form of political risk (sudden 
collapse of a government leading to an abrupt change of policies) and political 
uncertainty (pendulum swings in a divided government or the threat of po-
tential use of violence or unconstitutional means to change policy), but, 
importantly, it occurs within the existing political institutional structure. This is 
distinct from institutional volatility, as we will see, which is a shift in the rules 
of the game.  
3 Indeed, Coplin and O’Leary (1983) and Rice and Mahmoud (1990) detail 
ways in which policies can favorably impact the bottom line, and how busi-
nesses might be more engaged in potential risks and turning them into 
opportunities. 
4 This did not mean, however, that these EMEs were immune to institutional 
voids, as shown in Zhang, Zhou, and Ebbers, (2011). 
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3. Rethinking risk and uncertainty in a world of political 
institutional volatility 
As this brief review has shown, our understanding of the politics- 
businesses nexus has been necessitated (and spurred on) by the cur-
rent events of the day, from specific political risks such as nationaliza-
tion to political uncertainty created by regime shifts and macroeconomic 
instability. The latest round of research, encompassing institutions as 
the mediator of risks and, to some extent, the boundaries of uncertainty, 
has come to dominate IB thinking much as political risk did in the 1960s 
and political uncertainty did in the 1980s. A search of back issues of the 
Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS) and the Journal of World 
Business (JWB) reveals 1145 papers in JIBS (including the 2015 JIBS 
“Decade Award” winner, Meyer and Peng (2005), which discussed in-
stitutions in transition), and 863 articles in JWB devoted, in some part, 
to institutions (with 57 in JWB devoted exclusively to or touching upon 
political institutions). 
The ascendance of institutionalist thought has much to commend it 
in terms of expanding our horizons on how political institutions and 
businesses interact. In the first instance, institutionalists have forced IB 
scholars to focus on the incentives of political institutions in structuring 
business policy (as well as the interplay between business and political 
institutions and how they influence each other; see Cantwell, Dunning, 
& Lundan, 2010), while also bringing attention to the relative impor-
tance of the various rules of the game in structuring policies of direct 
relevance for business. At the same time, the expansion into institutions 
allowed international business to “draw upon key insights from political 
science, political economy and sociology, and examining how firm-level 
strategy or performance varies across different institutional constructs 
developed elsewhere” (Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008:538). Finally, and 
in line with the utility of IB as a distinct discipline, the expansion of IB 
into institutions also helped to explain changes in international business 
in the 1990s and 2000s, when institutional change itself was the key 
issue MNEs faced in emerging markets. 
However, in the prescient words of Jakobsen (2010:481), “multi-
national companies today probably face a much broader array of risks 
than during the nationalization wave of the 1960s and 1970,” and to this 
we may add that these risks have even transcended the political un-
certainty of the 1980s or the institutional components comprising the 
operating environment, identified in the 1990s. Although the shift to 
institutionalism provided a new basis for understanding the role of po-
litical institutions, it also created a paradigm which somewhat sub-
sumed risk and uncertainty as structural and exogenous (rather than 
situational and endogenous) challenges for businesses. This was a 
feasible approach when institutional distance and voids were omni-
present, but the paramount issue facing business as we enter the 2020s is 
distinctly different: institutional volatility (Hartwell, 2018), a mélange 
of specific political risks, political volatility, and political uncertainty 
driven from above by a shift in institutions themselves (as shown in 
Table 1). Whereas the rules of the game in most developed economies 
(and some developing economies) over the past thirty years have been 
clearly delineated, creating boundaries of the constraints and opportu-
nities available to businesses, the volatility of the past decade – encap-
sulated by the rise of an anti-globalist populism and the reorienting of 
liberal democracies to fight an unseen virus – has drafted new rules. 
Before focusing specifically on the current events which typify 
institutional volatility (see Section V), it is important to understand the 
channels via which all forms of political institutions exert an influence 
on business. A useful framework can be found in the underlying tenets of 
Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921), with risk and uncertainty char-
acterized into four basic categories as given and described in Fig. 2: 
known/knowns, known/unknowns, unknown/knowns and unknow-
n/unknowns (Makridakis & Bakas, 2020). 
From our perspective, it is the bottom row of Fig. 2 that has the most 
relevance for IB, as political risk and political uncertainty as conceptu-
alized by the extant literature fall in the known/unknowns quadrant (the 
lower left-hand box). Political risk is fundamentally a statistically sta-
tionary concept that posits unknowns which can be characterized (and 
hence managed or financially hedged). Similarly, environmental un-
certainty, as explored in the 1980s IB literature, followed Bayesian te-
nets and was predicated on the ability of a business to quantify overall 
risks, revising prior distributions on the basis of new information. This 
approach also operated on an assumption of stationarity, in that 
modeling of the broader operating environment which a firm faced 
could encompass an underlying stochastic process which had probabil-
ities of regime shifts, but these shifts were increasingly unlikely (and 
downgraded accordingly) unless there was an increase in variance (see 
Brock & Carpenter, 2006 for an analog from the natural world). In this 
manner, the institutional environment remained an upper and lower 
bound for risk quantification, with a slight probability that these bounds 
would change (and the likelihood of this change linked to escalating 
risks which could be patently seen). Firm strategy would then operate 
within these constraints, acknowledging the presence of known/un-
knowns but utilizing prediction and, hence, allowing pricing and man-
agement as a function of probability (Makridakis & Bakas, 2020; 
Marshall, Udechukwu, Wang, Lin, & Chipulu, 2019). 
However, extreme uncertainty such as that generated by institutional 
volatility (distinct from institutional reform, which implies either a di-
rection or, at best, an endpoint), exhibits fundamentally unpredictable 
or uncharacterizable (at least with current information and technologies 
and without some manipulation) paths which may exceed the bound-
aries of possible paths available under a stable regime. In Fig. 2, this 
would be the lower right-hand box, comprising unknown/unknowns, 
which are characterized by sudden unpredictable regime shifts, re-
versals, and events unmoored from the existing institutional boundaries. 
The challenge this presents for business is manifold, as institutional 
volatility creates an entirely new set of unknowns which themselves are 
uncertain; if institutions are conceived of as ways to decrease trans-
action costs (North, 1987) or increase the dissemination of information 
(Bergh, Ketchen, Orlandi, Heugens, & Boyd, 2019), volatility of these 
institutions may instead generate higher transaction costs, more diffi-
culties in obtaining information, and, especially, greater uncertainty on 
which information is valued or which incentives should be prioritized. 
As noted above, institutional volatility rewrites the rules of the game, 
making previous assumptions about the boundaries of risk and uncer-
tainty untenable. For businesses, thus, it is imperative to move towards a 
model which can help to operationalize understanding of 
unknown/unknowns. 
4. Political leadership and institutional volatility: consequences 
for IB scholarship 
A first step towards understanding the ramifications of changing the 
rules of the game can be seen if we further subdivide the unknown/ 
unknowns of Fig. 2 into two parts: (1) those unknowns that may forever 
remain unknown as they have no parameterizable aspect at all, and (2) 
those unknowns that could exist in another category, but we simply have 
no conception that they are there at all. The second of these unknown/ 
unknowns is the more important, as they have the possibility of being 
converted into another form either analytically or via discovery 
(Marshall et al., 2019); additionally, they provide the possibility of real 
advantage as they allow for better operationalization and forecasting of 
the political environment and hence a basis of better decision making. 
With specific reference to institutions, the drivers of these unknowns 
can, in some sense, be discovered (in the conception of Packard & Clark, 
2020, a portion of the aleatory uncertainty may become epistemic, that 
is, able to be mitigated or at least prepared for) if we focus on the inner 
workings of institutions and why they change, mutate, and shift. A large 
literature focuses on the gradual evolution of institutions (inter alia 
Blyth, Hodgson, Lewis, & Steinmo, 2011; Lewis & Steinmo, 2012) and 
understanding how an institution shifts its mission or expands/contracts 
it over time is a good starting point for understanding the longer-term 
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waves of change that can generate or maintain uncertainty (Glismann, 
1987; Grübler & Nakićenović, 1991; Kurki, 2019). Such an approach can 
capture longer-term political risks within a given institutional structure 
relevant for business; explaining, for example, why protests erupt in a 
system which has been closed for so long. However, examining the 
change of institutions solely as a long-term process (based on world 
historical periods, exogenous factors, and relative prices) will reveal 
little about sudden regime shifts and unknown/unknowns, especially if 
one treats institutional change as a “sandpile” event (Bak, Tang, & 
Wiesenfeld, 1987), which results in massive shifts of form but not of 
function. As Ribeiro, de Deus, Loureiro, and e Albuquerque, 2018:15) 
correctly note, “in a sandpile…perturbations do not change its organi-
zation – the organization of the system is very similar before and after an 
avalanche, but in a capitalist economy those perturbations trigger 
institutional answers that reorganize the system”. 
A better way to frame current drivers of unknown/unknowns in the 
institutional realm is to instead look to who specifically is leading the 
institution at any point in time. Such a focus on leaders embodies an 
analytical viewpoint which combines the longer-term focus of institu-
tional mechanisms (as semi-permanent and slow to change) with the 
short-term (and human) modalities which can set in motion the same 
very changes necessary to move an institution. This area has been the 
domain of political science (and to a far lesser extent, psychology and 
sociology), which has attempted to understand the human drivers of 
institutional volatility that create the conditions for unknown/un-
knowns; this includes with distinct literatures on the role of leaders in 
either creating revolutionary change (Roland, 2004; Skocpol, 1979) or 
stifling it (De Mesquita & Smith, 2009) and leadership literature as it 
relates to crisis management (see, e.g., Allison, 1971 for one of the 
earlier works in this area). 
The insights of political science have helped to create an expansive 
view of political uncertainty built upon economic foundations, namely 
in examining the incentives which politicians have to avoid or create 
institutional volatility. For example, if we were to consider only rational, 
calculating institutions in a country, focused on alleviating transaction 
costs and driven by internal logic rather than fallible humans, there 
would be no room for anything other than exogenously induced insti-
tutional volatility, as it would do little more than reflect a failure of the 
institution and a negative for society. Effectively, we have nothing more 
than a model of institutional determinism. However, the fact that 
institutional volatility does exist means that either there is no unanimity 
on what certain institutions should do (the very definition of politics) or, 
seen from a more economic perspective, that there are incentives, ben-
efits, and costs to such volatility and that these benefits and costs are not 
distributed uniformly in the society. The entire “policy entrepreneur-
ship” literature focuses on the use of crises or creation of volatility to 
advance particular agendas (Breunig & Koski, 2018; Bronk & Jacoby, 
2020; Keeler, 1993), and political science recognizes that self-interested, 
optimizing politicians may benefit from changes of the rules of the game. 
Like financial markets, the political marketplace is full of winners who 
profited off of volatility rather than seeking safety in relatively low-risk 
strategies, meaning that in certain situations, creating unknown/un-
knowns is actually a deliberate strategy of politicians and leaders rather 
than seeking stability. 
Unfortunately, and perhaps unwittingly, the current IB research 
focusing on institutions has pushed aside the role that politicians, min-
isters, and bureaucrats play in determining policy and ensuring its 
implementation or hinderance (Devinney & Hartwell, 2020), seeing 
institutions as driver-less vehicles influencing incentives from outside 
the business ecosystem. In current IB theory, including in the literature 
discussed above, political actors are literally given a set stage with lines 
to perform, and much IB scholarship abstracts completely away from the 
political actor and towards the faceless institution arguing that it is the 
institutional structure that determines outcomes. If management mat-
ters for IB – and an entire sub-discipline argues that it does – why would 
it not for political institutions? Or to use an oft used phrase initially 
coined by Ronald Reagan’s personnel director, Scott Faulkner, 
“personnel is policy” – and if that is not the case, why waste time with 
people when all that matters are the institutional rules and routines?5 
Clearly, the public, media, and policy makers all believe the driver of the 
institutional vehicle is extremely influential in directing policy out-
comes (Hauser & Siegel, 2020). 
The exclusion of political actors has been problematic for the reason 
noted earlier, mainly the reality that volatility might be something that 
political actors actually create for their own ends. Theoretically and 
conceptually, IB theory has (mostly) operated under the notion that both 
risk and uncertainty are bad, both for firms operating in an environment 
and for the governments involved, a desire at odds with the insight from 
political science that suppressed volatility may make events even less 
predictable (Taleb & Blyth, 2011). More critically, there is evidence on 
the lack of congruence between firms and political actors on the (lack of) 
desirability of risk or prolonged uncertainty (Julio & Yook, 2012). 
Indeed, the reality of a world where claims of “fake news” and “alter-
native facts” or tweetstorms of conspiracy theories and the creation of 
continuous political distractions is one where there is a clear strategy of 
leaders forcing the political and social environment into one where 
known/knowns are questioned, and unknown/knowns and unknow-
n/unknowns start to dominate. This is precisely the thesis laid out by 
Bronk and Jacoby (2020:25) when they discuss the use of “narrative 
Fig. 2. Risk and Uncertainty States. 
Source: Adapted from Makridakis and Bakas (2020:4). 
5 An example of this is the fact that the Harvard Kennedy School has a course 
(DPI-326M) entitled “Personnel Is Policy: Building Teams in American 
Government”. 
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coups” by populist leaders as a process for “capturing, reorienting, and 
subverting the sub-conscious conceptual grids and normative frames 
with which voters interpret events and construct the evidence needed to 
make decisions … crowding out competing discourses.” 
An additional challenge of political opportunism is not only that 
institutional volatility may be welcomed, but that long-established in-
stitutions could themselves become transmission mechanisms for this 
risk and uncertainty once captured by specific political leaders. A 
venerable institution, such as the legislative body, could be used to 
undermine other institutions such as the judiciary (as seen in Poland and 
Hungary), or the media could be utilized to push conspiracy theories and 
undermine legitimacy to an institution seen as wholly legitimate just 
three years prior (as seen in the United States). At the same time, existing 
institutions could be used to implement brand-new, contrary-to-purpose 
policies that might have massive negative ramifications for business. 
Again, a focus on institutions (and especially only on formal institutions, 
typified in a country’s body of laws) would miss this reality while 
traditional mitigation and arbitrage strategies for managing political 
risk – forecasting, forestalling, absorption – would become increasingly 
weakened in this environment (as the whole point of shifting the focus 
away from more “knowns” is to make it harder for those firms inter-
acting with political actors to come up with countering strategies). The 
attempts to generate volatility for political gain will also shorten the 
timeframe of firm decision making (as forecasting loses value), making 
planning and long-term investment riskier (as absorption puts assets at 
risk). 
From a dynamic capabilities perspective (Wilden, Devinney, & Lin, 
2018), there is real value in short term sensing and potential seizing of 
opportunities only when there are unknown/unknowns and only so long 
as the environment is not heavily dominated by uncertainty relative to 
risk and certainty. In a world with proportionately less uncertainty 
relative to risk and certainty, dynamic capabilities decline in value as 
risk and certainty can more readily be accommodated and priced into 
longer term strategic decision making. As uncertainty comes to domi-
nate, no amount of sensing has value as the environment is virtually 
unpredictable from time period to time period: Green and Korth’s 
(1974) previously mentioned view that the pervasiveness of risk led to 
managers ignoring it for expediency reasons relates to exactly this, as, in 
a world of high institutional volatility, pervasive unknown/unknowns 
(as opposed to high risk) may make it easier for firms to simply ignore 
the uncertainty totally. Sudden policy changes, linked to charismatic 
leaders or the dramatic realignment of political in-groups and out-group, 
can make Kingsley, Vanden Bergh, and Bonardi (2012:63) injunction – 
namely that “properly assessing a firm’s exposure to regulatory uncer-
tainty helps managers craft an appropriate integrated strategy” – diffi-
cult, as both firm exposure and regulatory uncertainty can be in a state 
of flux. This also implies that real options thinking becomes more 
valuable as the higher the implied volatility, the greater the value of an 
option. Yet, while Chi, Li, Trigeorgis, and Tsekrekos (2019) in their re-
view of real options in IB discuss uncertainty and political institutions, 
they do not take into account the importance of political actor induced 
uncertainty, which may be more pervasive than exogenous shocks. 
In sum, institutional volatility is driven not by longer-term historical 
processes, but by the short-term incentives of politicians working within 
(and looking to change) a given political institutional matrix. The next 
section provides two concrete and current examples of these types of 
institutional volatility, the rise of populism and the response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and how a view towards understanding political 
leadership is necessary for firms to respond rather than throwing in the 
towel completely. 
5. Illustrating the changing rules of the game: business under 
populism and pandemics 
Since its heyday in the 1970s and 1980s, a more prescriptive “in-
sider” MNE focus in the IB literature has come to be dominated by a 
more “outsider” institutionalist perspective, a concept which nests spe-
cific political risks and broader uncertainty therein to derive recom-
mendations. As noted, the IB literature reflected the worries of its day 
vis-a-vis political institutions, the issues of political risk, uncertainty, and 
institutional differences, which makes it understandable why under-
standing non-stationarity and the possibility of institutional volatility 
was simply not as pressing as understanding the quantifiable risks which 
were visible. 
However, over the past decade, the broader economics profession 
has extended the focus on political institutions to embrace the idea of 
policy uncertainty (Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2016; Bloom, 2009), a 
particular manifestation of institutional volatility, and examined its ef-
fects on the macroeconomy, finance (Kelly, Pástor, & Veronesi, 2016), 
household consumption (Leduc & Liu, 2016), and investment (Bloom, 
Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, & Terry, 2018). Indeed, political 
risk and institutional volatility has become more relevant since the 
global financial crisis of 2007–2009, with a rise in political turbulence, 
accompanied at the same time by an increase in political uncertainty 
moored to existing and incredibly durable institutions. Given this re-
ality, it is time for the IB literature to reflect these new innovations, 
especially in light of the two most pressing political issues facing the 
world today, in order to help business better understand this phenom-
enon – and be prepared to counteract it. 
The Scylla and Charybdis of populism and pandemic are the key 
examples of institutional volatility and institutional non-stationarity, 
requiring a re-examination of the overwhelming reliance on semi- 
permanent (and actor-less) institutions in the IB literature. In line with 
the theoretical framework sketched in Section III, long-established in-
stitutions in developed economies have actually become transmission 
mechanisms for this risk and uncertainty, as they are either being used to 
generate uncertainty by political actors on purpose (in the case of 
populism) or to implement brand-new policies which are known to have 
massive negative ramifications for business (in the case of the COVID-19 
pandemic and subsequent lockdown). This section sketches just how 
populism and the COVID pandemic have the possibility to affect busi-
ness, and in particular, how the IB literature should respond in order to 
generate practical and forward-looking insights. 
5.1. Our populist times 
The rise of populism since the mid-2000s, accelerating during and 
after the global financial crisis, has once again brought political uncer-
tainty front and center and moved it from the emerging market niche to 
more developed democratic economies as well as those with historic 
authoritarian tendencies. While the exigencies of populism have been 
well-explored in the political science literature (see Rode & Revuelta, 
2015; Pappas, 2016, or Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018) for excellent 
summaries of the state of the art) and thus will not be rehashed here,6 a 
brief overview of the possible channels via which populism may act on 
business is necessary. The economics and business literature has pro-
vided ample evidence on the effects of political and economic policy risk 
and uncertainty on the firm at all stages of development even in “normal 
times”; elections provoke unease in firms and lead to a rollback in in-
vestment (Jens, 2017; Julio & Yook, 2012), while weak economic con-
ditions can lead political uncertainty to increasing the risk premia that 
firms face (Pástor & Veronesi, 2013). In countries where government 
connections are more important (due to the pervasive nature of the state 
and rampant intervention), political uncertainty causes even more dif-
ficulties for firms, as shown in Xu, Chen, Xu, and Chan (2016). This is 
especially true if uncertainty is unforeseen (unknown/unknown), as, in 
environments used to stable politics. Political uncertainty can vitiate the 
6 The fact that political science has been debating this issue constantly for a 
decade or more proves our point on the insights to be learned from the disci-
pline, especially if the reader is unacquainted with the basics of populism. 
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amount of information available in the marketplace, making firm as-
sessments, investments, and valuation more difficult (Chen, Chen, 
Wang, & Zheng, 2018). Oetzel, Bettis, and Zenner (2001) also make the 
point that we can even be uncertain about uncertainty, as commonly 
used country risk guides are poor predictors of actual instability and 
conflate risk with uncertainty. 
In the context of populism, however, these bouts of uncertainty are 
magnified and enlarged as they reflect part of the purposeful strategy of 
the populist parties and politicians. Indeed, the ideas underlying and 
animating populism are predicated on a change of what existed before at 
the policy, administrative, and institutional level (Barr, 2009), meaning 
that the longer-term worries of populism are not only worries about 
policies but about the rules of the game themselves. In this sense, 
populist electoral successes act as a negative uncertainty shock for many 
businesses. First, and foremost, they seek to reverse (sometimes 
abruptly) policies of previous leadership, promising “improvements” 
(Havlík, 2019) or herald a return to a prior golden era, as seen in the case 
of the Trump’s MAGA movement and Xi’s heralding of a new Confucian 
age. Secondly, they deliberately create turnover in administration so 
that favored people replace those of the “old regime” (Peters & Pierre, 
2019). Finally, they see their own reversals and advances based on its 
(mis)reading of the popular will (Eichengreen, 2018), meaning that even 
the projected march towards populism has had its share of setbacks 
(generating even more uncertainty). The current wave of populism, 
typified by the successes of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump in the 
United States, the continuing popularity of Narendra Modi in India, and 
the spread of democratic illiberalism in the new EU states of Central 
Europe, has been characterized expressly by such institutional volatility. 
While following some of the classical definitions of populism as 
noted above (e.g., Mudde, 2004), the post-global financial crisis surge of 
populism has been characterized by additional novelties, each with its 
own possibility to create specific challenges for business. We note some 
of the more important below.  
(1) It’s not just in developing markets anymore: A key characteristic of 
the current populist wave is the fact that is has captured devel-
oped as well as developing economies and, indeed, appears to 
have been generated from within more advanced economies and 
then spread back to emerging markets. While some populist 
successes predate the global financial crisis (Erdogan in Turkey or 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in the populist haven of 
Argentina), it is only since the near collapse of the global financial 
system from 2007 to 2009 that we have seen populism make 
strong inroads in most major economies (Kyle & Meyer, 2020). 
This reality means that developed country MNEs are now not only 
threatened by institutional voids and distance abroad but must 
also worry about home-country volatility possibly closing off 
markets or threatening supply chains. As populism is also often 
associated with economic stagnation (Funke et al., 2020), 
weakening economic conditions or a rebalancing of economic 
power due to populism at home can strike directly at firms’ de-
cisions to internationalize or their capabilities to do so.  
(2) “Fake news!” and manipulating the narrative: More so than earlier 
waves of populism in regions such as Latin America, the devel-
oped country version of populism has had an emphasis on 
creating variance in the belief system of the population via 
reducing the perceived validity of information sources; in this 
manner, existing, entrenched institutions can be subverted or 
dismissed altogether. This role of uncertainty and non- 
stationarity as a political strategy is noted by Bronk and Jacoby 
(2020:2), who argue that the “indeterminacy of the future en-
sures that expectations cannot be firmly anchored in objective 
probability functions, while making it impossible to know 
whether current models of best practice will remain pertinent in 
future.” Put in a more direct way, “the proliferation of dis- and 
misinformation churned out for profit or propaganda… [has] 
weakened the authority of the mediating institutions that pro-
duce and disseminate knowledge: universities, science, and the 
press. As a result, a cloud of suspicion shadows all claims to 
knowledge” (Brubaker, 2017:378), enhancing the ability of 
populist leaders to claim specific (or sole) knowledge of what 
objectively is the truth. If “truth” is embodied only in a particular 
leader – and not the marketplace – political masters must also be 
pleased lest their wrath be incurred, pushing out merit-based 
incentives in favor of patronage Kenny, 2017; (Morelli & Sasso, 
2020). 
This reality also means the need for firms to cultivate new political 
connections and invest resources into the political marketplace in order 
to avoid the deleterious effects that come with being on the outside (or 
worse, being associated with the old elites). While there is an interesting 
and rich literature on the effects of cultivating political connections and 
how they may help with firm performance (Ferguson & Voth, 2008; Wu, 
Wu, & Rui, 2021; Amore & Bennedsen 2013, Fernández-Méndez et al., 
2018), the application of the “political connections” literature to our 
new reality is also lacking. Unfortunately, we have little sense on how 
firms divert resources that could be spent competing in the actual 
marketplace in order to curry political favor or, more realistically, to 
deflect political attention in a populist regime (Müllner & Puck, 2018 is 
a notable, but limited, example).  
(3) An anti-global global phenomenon: Perhaps more importantly is the 
reality that, although this new wave of populism eschews glob-
alization, the wave itself has fed on international cross- 
pollination, as global populist coalitions have begun to form to 
support one another via related policies and strategies, coordi-
nating existing institutions and co-opting them for their own use 
(Meijers, 2011). Despite the diversity of populist strategies, their 
home country conditions, and the different personalities 
involved, the congruence of national objectives has led to insti-
tutional volatility being transmitted and reinforced by external 
actors. An excellent example of this seen with Poland, where 
power-behind-the-throne, Jarosław Kaczynski (the leader of the 
Law and Justice Party, Poland’s ruling populists), has attempted 
to emulate Hungarian’s populist leader, Viktor Orban, and has 
made common cause with him politically via anti-EU initiatives 
(Csehi & Zgut, 2020) while also forging closer links with him 
personally (Zwolski, 2017). The expansion and coordination of 
populism means additional amplification of uncertainty, as new 
institutional mechanisms come into being, economic policies 
focused on political imperatives (e.g., improving trade between 
like-minded countries) rule the day, and “official lines” become 
crucial for businesses to follow. 
Understanding “populism’s moment” (Devinney & Hartwell, 2020) 
is a new challenge for international business researchers and firms; at 
one-and-the-same time similar to, but unlike, any other political force 
faced in the past (hence, the early tendency to look for similarities be-
tween populism and prior political upheavals and changes). Current 
conceptions of emerging market firms may have evolved to address this 
issue, but a framework is lacking for considering the full range of coping 
strategies in a developed country context (Müllner, 2016), one which 
takes into account the political actors involved. As an example of this 
inadequacy, a narrowly interpreted institutionalist view may, by 
focusing on institutional distance, give distorted predictions about the 
effects of populism. While utilizing institutional tenets are necessary for 
understanding the longer-term shifts that populism creates, when 
applied to business, the notion of institutional distance may actually 
show a narrowing of distance but without any benefits for firms; put 
another way, populism may make developed countries more like 
emerging markets, but narrowing this distance does not imply that 
business will be any easier or that firms will reap any rewards. 
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As a final point, an optimist might dismiss away these issues as just 
another manifestation of political risk, one which will eventually fade 
into the background due to the inability of populism to persist as a po-
litical force. However, reality tells another story: Hicks (1931:3), writing 
forty years after a wave of populism in the United States, noted that “a 
backward glance at the history of populism shows that many of the re-
forms that the populists demanded, while despised and rejected for a 
season, won out triumphantly in the end.” More recent examinations of 
the issue come from Funke et al. (2020:3), who note that “populism is of 
a serial nature. Countries that had a populist leader in history have a 
significantly higher likelihood of seeing another populist coming to 
power… [and m]any populists are successful at surviving in office and 
shape their country’s political fate for a decade or more.” The depth of 
the current wave of populism is reflected in the staying power of populist 
parties and leaders once in power, with leaders such as Viktor Orban 
ruling since 2010 and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner of Argentina in 
power from 2007 to 2015 and back in power as Vice-President since 
2019. Its breadth is seen in the geographic and variety of populist in-
fluence, along with the likelihood that many populist ideas will continue 
to persist beyond the current political phase. As both Hicks (1931) and 
Funke et al. (2020) note, nearly nine decades apart, populism’s influ-
ence goes far beyond the initial charismatic leader who set it in motion, 
so that even after the initial bout of revolutionary fervor, the mark made 
on institutions persists for years, if not decades.7 In a political strategy 
which seeks to change the rules of the game, institutions no longer 
become the guard rails that they might have been against other 
extremist policies. 
5.2. Our locked-down times 
In 2020, the political phenomenon of populism was joined by (and in 
many ways was fed by) the COVID-19 pandemic, an issue unlike any 
living politician had faced before. Although the SARS and H1N1 pan-
demics had occurred within the previous two decades, the scale of 
COVID-19 meant that there was little experience of such an event to rely 
upon. At the same time, the spread of the pandemic was so quick and 
surprising (the very definition of a crisis, see Hermann (1972)) – and the 
sense of urgency so unique – that even established institutional mech-
anisms had little experience on how to deal with it in a policy sense (in 
the nomenclature of Fig. 2, precisely an “unknown/unknown”). This 
unprecedented scenario led to wildly divergent policy responses, 
culminating in prohibitions on economic activity and movement 
(“lockdowns”) being imposed, lifted, and re-imposed alongside the 
waves of the virus globally. 
Despite the evolution of organizations and institutions to work with 
complex technologies and attempt to minimize risks and the occurrence 
of “accidents” (Roe & Schulman, 2016), “black swan” events such as 
COVID-19 can also serve to threaten the existing institutional order 
(Cortell & Peterson, 1999), especially if these institutions have already 
been weakened by waves of populism. While COVID-19 represents an 
extreme event unlikely (hopefully) to be repeated in the near future, it 
has elevated the ability of political figures to push the boundaries of 
existing institutions and reshape them for particular ends.8 In fact, one 
of the keys lessons of COVID-19 is that institutions actually have limits in 
times of stress: bereft of memory or guidance in an unprecedented sit-
uation, and with any institutional capabilities highly dispersed across 
decision units, institutions themselves must rely on their leaders for 
guidance. However, unlike in populism, where there are specific 
blueprints for changing society and its institutional matrix, during the 
pandemic we have seen political actors without any guidance from 
personal experience who are falling back on their heuristics, ideologies, 
and pre-conceived worldviews to make decisions under stress (Giger-
enzer, 2015 details the overall process of heuristic-based decision 
making). One bizarre example of this is how the UK Health Minister, 
Matt Hancock, pointed out that much of his surprising successful vaccine 
strategy was based on the movie Contagion (Zeffman, 2021). This reality 
means that the inherent personality traits of each leader and their 
existing heuristics had important ramifications for policy during the 
lockdown, moving beyond the institutional mechanisms which were 
designed for “normal” times and implementing extraordinary policies 
which would have been unthinkable just one year earlier.9 
This does not mean that institutions have necessarily been wholly 
discarded or fundamentally changed during the pandemic. Indeed, in 
advanced democracies, institutional structures continue to set the 
boundaries for permissible policies, informed by culture and social re-
lationships, and there have been no overt coups or overthrows of dem-
ocratic processes (despite hyperbole from all manner of political 
operatives). What the pandemic has done is instead expand the 
boundaries of the set of permissible policies, moving the guard rails 
further back, as formal institutions, where unable to contribute, have 
been bypassed (Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2006 discuss this phenomenon). 
And, as with populism, the pandemic has allowed for specific leaders to 
utilize institutions to implement policies which are either outside of 
their original remit or are actually contrary to the usual functioning of 
the institutions, generating high levels of institutional volatility and 
uncertainty. 
A key example of this – but by no means the only one – can be found 
in the United States. While the global response to COVID-19 has been a 
patchwork of responses and approaches, and even meta-organizations 
such as the European Union have had a hard time in coordinating a 
response (which, by most accounts, should be within its domain, see 
Ahrne, Brunsson, & Kerwer, [2016]), the United States has been a spe-
cial case of similar institutional frameworks with diverging policy re-
sponses. The unique federalist nature of the American political system, 
with 50 separate states and additional administrative subregions with 
substantial autonomy, has been a driver of the institutional responses to 
the pandemic, but the US also showed that leadership (or lack thereof) at 
the sub-national level could override institutions at key junctures. While 
the economic shock of the virus was exogenous, creating its own form of 
uncertainty, the lockdown responses were endogenously generated and 
were much more broad reaching; depending upon the jurisdiction, these 
activities included blanket prohibitions on economic activity, travel 
restrictions, and differential responses by law enforcement to violations 
of the lockdown. And despite being a country underpinned by very 
similar political institutions across state lines, a common language, and 
a common historical experience, within a few weeks of the start of the 
pandemic, it became apparent that the jurisdiction in which a business 
was located in the United States was the key to understanding just what 
the lockdown response was going to be (a reality which grew with the 
second wave of the pandemic in autumn and winter 2020). 
The variegated responses to the coronavirus from the different states 
in the US, ranging from very laissez-faire to strict lockdowns can be 
traced in some sense to ideology: as Fig. 3 shows, on average (and not 
controlling for severity of outbreak), states led by Republican governors 
had a much less stringent response in terms of lockdown than Demo-
cratic ones. Scratching the surface beneath this data, however, shows the 
influence of leaders in addition to pre-existing cultural traits and 
7 This is not to say that the revolutionary ardor necessarily cools, as some 
leaders (Mao in China, for example), periodically stoked the fires of populism in 
order to renew the populist zeal (Perry, 2002). Such a persistent and intense 
populism is bound to have even greater effects on uncertainty and thus be even 
more dangerous for firms.  
8 Thanks to the editor for suggesting this framing. 
9 A good example of this is the fact that in the US President Trump disbanded 
the NSC Global Health Security and Biodefense team that was initially set up by 
President Obama. He also chose to remove CDC personnel from its Beijing of-
fice, which dramatically reduced communication during the initial stages of the 
pandemic in China. 
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institutional capacity. In particular, states facing similar challenges with 
regard to the severity of the pandemic enacted such different policies, 
meaning that public health policies and guidance from the scientific 
community could not have been the main drivers of the response (see 
Hartwell, 2020 for a systematic cross-national analysis relating leader-
ship to COVID response). 
A (much more simplified) example of this can be seen in the contrast 
between Maine and Idaho, two states in the US with a similar population 
size and similar effects of COVID-19 through the first wave of COVID to 
July 2020 (Fig. 4). While Idaho has a higher absolute number of deaths 
attributable to COVID, this may be due to the surprising spatial distri-
bution of the population, as Maine has 62 % of its population living in 
“rural” areas while Idaho has 32 %, or it may be attributed to the slight 
difference in perceived healthcare quality in the two states (according to 
US News & World Report, Maine is ranked 19th out of 50 states in 
overall healthcare quality versus 26th for Idaho, although Idaho scores 
much higher than Maine on “public health”). However, as Fig. 4 shows, 
the response to pandemic was widely divergent across the two, and, in 
fact, goes against a simple explanation that the response was driven by 
public health differences or social norms. In Idaho, a Republican 
governor (Brad Little) ensured that Idaho’s lockdown was far less 
stringent, even as deaths rose, while Janet Mills, a Democrat, kept 
Maine’s stringency index elevated even long after the deaths had pla-
teaued over the summer of 2020. While one could argue that any 
Republican or Democrat would have pursued the same policies, it is 
instructive to note that Governor Janet Mills campaigned and won in 
2018 explicitly on a health policy platform (Goldman & Sommers, 
2019), and thus her own policy passions translated into action during 
the pandemic – and this is even more prominent when one considers 
that, in the first month of the pandemic, Maine lost almost the precise 
amount of jobs per COVID death as Idaho (2324 jobs lost per death in 
Maine versus 2315 in Idaho, see McGowan, 2020). 
Fig. 3. Average Stringency Index for Republican and 
Democrat-led States, 2020-21. 
Source: Based on data from the Oxford Covid-19 Government 
Response Tracker (OxCGRT), available at https://github.com/ 
OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker. The Stringency Index is a com-
posite of several nonpharmaceutical policies including stay at 
home restrictions, restrictions on movement, and restrictions 
on public gatherings, with higher numbers indicating higher 
restrictions (scale of 0–100). Arithmetic average taken of all 
Republican/Democrat-led states’ Index on a particular day.   
Fig. 4. Government Response and COVID-19 Deaths in Maine and Idaho, 2020. 
Source: Oxford Stringency Index. The number of deaths is those as reported by the state. 
C.A. Hartwell and T. Devinney                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Journal of World Business 56 (2021) 101225
12
Other anecdotal examples of the importance of leaders, rather than 
institutions, abound across the responses to the pandemic in the United 
States. For example, with a population density of 10.7 people per square 
mile, South Dakota appeared to be under much less threat of rapid 
spread of the virus, and Governor Kristi Noem avoided a blanket lock-
down and instead issued a “stay at home” order only for vulnerable 
citizens over the age of 65 in March 2020. Throughout the first wave of 
the crisis, South Dakota consistently saw an R0 of less than 1, with a 
large spike in cases (over 134 %) in the beginning of May attributed to 
an upswing in testing rather than an actual additional wave of in-
fections. In fact, the hotspot for coronavirus in South Dakota was not its 
sparsely populated land but its meat processing plants, as the Smithfield 
pork factory in Sioux Falls was (as of May 4, 2020) responsible for 44 % 
of the infections in the state (Dickerson & Jordan, 2020). 
Coupled with this reality on the ground, however, was Governor 
Noem’s fiery rhetoric, noting in an interview on Fox News that “’What 
I’ve seen across the country is so many people give up their liberties for 
just a little bit of security. And I don’t have to do that.” Such an approach 
made her a “a darling of right-wing media icons” while at the same time 
accused of “pushing politics during a pandemic” (Whitney, 2020). And 
despite having only 74 deaths out of a population of approximately 885, 
000 at the end of the first wave, Governor Noem was nonetheless pil-
loried as “an ideologue sacrificing lives on the anvil of Trumpology” 
(McGreal, 2020). Again, while any Republican from the Midwest might 
have been expected to play this role, other similarly situated governors 
(e.g., Eric Holcomb of Indiana or Doug Burgum of North Dakota) did not 
actually do so, and South Dakota’s approach to the pandemic (especially 
during the second wave) was far less stringent than these other states. 
Moreover, Noem’s decisions, based on her politics as well as a read on 
the situation on the ground, led to conflicts which were specific to South 
Dakota: while the approval rate of the Governor’s handling of the virus 
was 49 % in April 2020, second to last among all Governors (rising to 58 
% by the end of May),10 more problematic was the Governor’s instru-
mental role in encouraging a massive motorcycle rally (the Sturgis 
Rally) to go on as planned in South Dakota between August 7 and 16, 
2020, bringing more than 500,000 participants in close proximity. 
Recent research (Dave, McNichols, & Sabia, 2020:1) has estimated that 
the rally may have acted as super-spreader event, as “counties that 
contributed the highest inflows of rally attendees experienced a 
6.4–12.5 percent increase in COVID-19 cases relative to counties that 
did not contribute inflows.” 
These examples, derived solely from the United States, have ana-
logues globally, as policies dependent upon the pre-existing biases and 
heuristics of leaders, coupled with the resurgence of the virus in late 
2020, have kept businesses in the dark globally about what is/is not 
permitted, what might come next, and how important jurisdictional 
boundaries are. Similar volatile pandemic responses have occurred in 
different countries around the world: for example, in the United 
Kingdom, where massive and continued state intervention against 
businesses have occurred, been repealed, and then surprisingly re- 
imposed (seemingly dependent upon the amount of pressure levied on 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson, see Moss & Harris, 2020), or in 
Zimbabwe, where lockdowns were introduced with a 48 -h warning 
(Mackworth-Young et al., 2021) and where over 100,000 people were 
arrested for COVID “breaches” (including not wearing facemasks, see 
British Broadcasting Corporation, 2020, July 19]) but where prosecu-
tion suspiciously appeared to be targeted at activists and members of the 
opposition. But these policies imposed in the heat of a crisis do not tell 
the whole story of what the uncertainty of such an emergency response 
means for firms at time t, t + 1, or t + 10, it does not tell when such a 
policy might be enacted again, nor does it say what are the boundaries of 
these particular emergency powers. 
The biggest challenges for business is the reality that, throughout the 
world, institutional guardrails were quickly removed under the guise of 
fighting the virus, with new powers not normally present in a liberal 
democracy aggrandized to executives; to take another example from the 
United States of the arbitrary use of emergency powers, New York City 
set a number of lockdown prohibitions, including one against “bars” but 
not against “restaurants” being open, arguing that there was a need for 
“substantial food” to be served to be compliant. And although the rollout 
of vaccines at the end of 2020 and through the beginning of 2021 has 
promised an eventual return to “normal” in the (uncertain) future, the 
business world has been dramatically altered specifically by the insti-
tutional volatility accompanying the pandemic. Firms that once were 
thriving have gone out of business and it is very difficult to “un-bank-
rupt” a specific firm (data at this stage is somewhat inconclusive, but 
early evidence by Holtemöller & Muradoglu, 2020 shows that the like-
lihood of bankruptcies for debt-laden firms during the pandemic to be 
well over two-thirds). Even firms that were rescued by massive gov-
ernment fiscal packages may find that they face a new competitive 
landscape, one that is much more sensitive to political risk and beholden 
to government largess, as they are forced to compete in a political 
marketplace rather than the actual marketplace. 
At the same time, the unwinding of globalization – and the ease with 
which it was done – may become a permanent feature of a post-COVID 
world, as localization and diversified supply chains become more 
important than reliance on far-flung locales, a point brought to the fore 
with the closure of the Suez Canal due to a shipping mishap in March 
2021. The most far flung of these locales could be China, which may find 
itself less central in global supply chains as the post-COVID world un-
winds itself (at the same time, however, China’s rebound from the virus 
has showcased internal firm capabilities, meaning that firms elsewhere 
may soon find themselves competing with Chinese firms, a dramatic 
shift in the competitive landscape). Finally, the ability of governments to 
bring complex market economies to a halt is a Pandora’s box which 
cannot be closed, and firms may find that a riskier world may result in 
this lever being utilized more frequently for any manner of crises (real or 
perceived). In this sense, the post-COVID world may increase the num-
ber of unknown/unknowns, as governments are more likely to utilize 
the tools acquired during the pandemic in more (relatively) tranquil 
situations. 
6. Conclusions (and Beginnings) 
This perspective has examined the history of political risk and po-
litical uncertainty in international business, tracing out the evolution of 
these concepts over time and showing how the IB literature has been 
motivated by the issues of relevance at the time of their development. 
Whether considering expropriation, day-to-day risks in emerging mar-
kets, or deeper institutional change, the IB literature rightly brought its 
intellectual firepower to bear on the current issues that firms faced. In 
doing so, it not only revealed its relevance and ability to incorporate 
novelty but also how theoretical development can be motivated by new 
– and especially surprising - events. However, while this has resulted in a 
deep and rich literature on specific facets of the nexus between politics 
and business, it has left the discipline with conceptual blind spots 
regarding the role of political personalities in shaping the environment 
for firms, a reality which has been exposed with the rise of populism and 
the responses to the global coronavirus pandemic. 
Indeed, there is a fundament endogeniety between events, in-
stitutions, and political agents and policy makers that we have, up to this 
point, downplayed in both our theoretical development and empirical 
modeling (Moe, 2006). The COVID pandemic illustrates this, as it will 
forever be linked to the people involved in the response – Trump/Biden, 
Fauci, Merkel, Putin, Bolsonaro, etc. – far in excess of the institutions 
involved in the response; in reality, it was the leadership of the insti-
tutional structures that mattered far more than those structures when 
the event and its potential implications were basically unknown and 
10 The Governor below Noem in the poll was David Ige, a Democrat from 
Hawaii, which had the most restrictive lockdown in the United States. 
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clear roadmaps out of the predicament were simply not available. 
Whereas existing IB work has focused on the undesirability of either 
quantifiable risk or institutional uncertainty for business – and thus how 
firms should respond – it has also tended to align political environments 
and ultimate objectives with business ones (see, for example, Ekici & 
Onsel, 2013). But once one incorporates the incentives of political 
leaders and some accounting for their personalities and own operating 
environments (Alesina & Tabellini, 2007), this assumption need not be 
true. In fact, as we noted above, both risk and uncertainty can be 
desirable from the point of view of a politician (Bronk & Jacoby, 2020), 
with the entire socio-political environment a tool that is much more 
actively manipulated by political actors (Chesterley & Roberti, 2018). 
This is especially true when the point of the exercise is to disrupt the 
existing balance between winners and losers from the system, the 
domain of populism, which brands itself as not only anti-elite but also 
fundamentally as “of the people.” At the same time, the ongoing 
haphazard response to COVID-19 across national and sub-national ju-
risdictions has shown just how crucial the role of specific leaders can be 
in shaping public policy in a manner that operates, at times, far beyond 
common institutional frameworks. Indeed, those focused on issues of 
“institutional quality” would be extremely hard pressed to argue that the 
highly variable response and success/failure rates of major developed 
economies has anything to do with their institutions and has much more 
to do with the decisions made by politicians. 
What this implies for firms is that dynamic political capabilities 
become more critical in an uncertain environment (e.g., Henisz, 2016) 
and that real options increase in value. The greater the uncertainty, the 
more firms must wait for information to be revealed and the faster they 
must react to that information once it becomes known (Dai & Zhang, 
2019; Jens, 2017). Hence, preparedness aforethought becomes a critical 
operational need for MNEs. Opportunities have to be seized more 
quickly but also divested faster and long-term reconfiguration of assets 
or associations becomes riskier and hence of lower long-term value, 
particularly if firms have to have a strategic stockpile of options waiting 
in the wings. As Wilden et al. (2018) show, the greater the “non-sta-
tionary” component of the business environment, the less value there is 
in long term dynamic capabilities and the less valid are models aimed at 
predicting policy changes. Even governments that manage policy via 
poll numbers struggle in this environment as the “base” may not be 
consistent or even predictable in its preferences (e.g., not knowing even 
what they want, other than something different from what they have 
been getting). All of these realities mean firms must find new ways to 
adapt, ways that remain (at the moment) out of the reach of extant 
theories. By focusing exclusively on underlying institutions or specific, 
narrow risks, a firm could easily miss the where, why and by whom the 
unknown/unknowns are being generated (see, e.g., Weinberg, 2020 on 
who decides to be a politician and why). This implies a need to move 
more towards real option strategic logics with components of strategic 
and operational modularity that allows for flexible response. 
For firms and researchers in the coming years, there should be a focus 
on the specific attributes of political leaders and how they impact the 
myriad of firm decisions; this is perhaps the only way to give firms and 
managers a fighting chance in adapting to a rapidly shifting global sit-
uation. Unlike the rather ad hoc nature of the previous thirty years in 
piecing together research on risk and uncertainty, we should be striving 
for a framework that can take into account situational and personality 
attributes in addition to institutional ones, incorporating the role of 
specific political actors and their abilities within an institutional matrix. 
This is a crucial point because, as recent research shows (Funke et al., 
2020), both populism and the disruption of pandemics persist long after 
the specific actors who initiate policies disappear off of the stage. Such a 
framework, creating a much more unifying approach to the nexus of 
politics and business and examining leaders, institutions, and policies, 
can offer much more trenchant insights for understanding how firms can 
and should operate, reacting to the use of risk and uncertainty as a po-
litical weapon, and adapting to the new reality of institutional volatility. 
Finally, at another level, what we are arguing for is a more founda-
tional understanding of political risk and uncertainty that takes into 
account the fact that human beings matter to institutional and societal 
decision making and outcomes. A number of scholars have pushed a 
viewpoint that “managers matter” (see, e.g., Devinney, 2011; Buckley & 
Casson, 2019) and that there needs to be an incorporation of the role and 
decision-making latitude of the manager (or managers) into our theo-
retical frameworks and empirical models. At a minimum, the burden of 
proof should be on scholars to show under what circumstances mana-
gerial agency does and does not matter. We argue that the same logic 
and reasoning applies to socio-political agents in the international 
context. If it did not, we could argue that who won elections (or staged a 
coup) really doesn’t matter since the institutions may not change much. 
But we know this is not true (Jones & Olken, 2005). Who holds power 
determines not just policy at the local level but also the geopolitical 
landscape in which MNEs operate. Our theories would not only gain 
from such a perspective, but our voice into global policy discussions 
would be enhanced by our ability to have nuanced and more immedi-
ately relevant understanding of the ebbs and flows of trade and eco-
nomic policy (and hence be able to speak more saliently to those 
determining such policies). While international business has whole-
heartedly embraced a belief that institutions matter to the environment 
in which MNEs operate, we believe it needs to take the next step by 
recognizing that “politicians matter” in the structure and use of those 
institutions - and that, without understanding the motivations of poli-
ticians, we cannot understand how the institutional vehicle is being 
driven. 
To conclude, we argue that it is incumbent on IB scholars whose 
work deals with political uncertainties and institutional environments 
work to take into account more about the personalities of the key agents 
of influence in institutional environments. At a minimum, if it is argued 
that politicians and government agents do not matter compared to the 
semi-permanent edifice of an institution, then it should be shown 
explicitly that they do not matter. In most cases, this amounts to 
incorporation of the political and government leadership into an anal-
ysis: this need not be as detailed as the replication of the work in political 
science and psychology on the personality traits or decision-making 
styles of politicians (e.g., Bakker, Schumacher, & Rooduijn, 2020; 
Sheffer, Loewen, Soroka, Walgrave, & Sheafer, 2018) but can be as 
simple as accounting for political variety in a society (e.g., something 
akin to cultural tightness), the orientation of the parties in power (e.g., 
on political orientation scales), the experience and background of the 
leadership group (e.g., have they been in power before), and so on. In 
addition, it is critical for researchers to distinguish between environ-
ments that represent business-as-usual stability – a world where the 
unknowns are either known or are few in number and potential impact – 
and those that represent persistent or truncated instability – a world 
more populated by unknown/unknowns. In the former environment 
(which has been what IB scholars have mostly studied) our institutional 
models most likely work quite well, as the stability does not test the 
limits of the institutions and it may be that the institutions drive policy 
and decision-making rules (Page, 2012). In the latter case, key agents 
come to dominate institutions as the decisions that need to be taken do 
not have ready analogs and require bespoke and potentially highly 
variable responses. In this sense, political agents become more entre-
preneurial (e.g., less poll driven) in their decision making as simple 
historic lessons have less relevance and their con-
stituencies/stakeholders look to them for leadership rather than simply 
delivery of an expected political outcome. It is also more likely that 
politicians will come into conflict with institutional bureaucracies and 
overrule their recommendations. It is also the case that politicians 
chosen and elected in these environments are different from those 
elected in more stable periods (Coller, Cordero, & Jaime-Castillo, 2018). 
It is these latter environments we need to study more intensively to glean 
the lessons that we can extract from unique outlier natural experiments. 
While some of this work has been done with respect to conflicts, climate 
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events and, now, COVID, it is important that we build a larger corpus of 
work that allows us to mitigate the known/ and unknown/unknowns 
and thereby enhance our practical impact on policy. 
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